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Abstract 
We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our 
study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and 
a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries 
like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and 
the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to 
compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the “conduct parameter” measuring 
the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that 
collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Liberalization of the telecommunications sector consists of opening all its segments to 
competition and privatization (Wallsten (2001)). Economic issues in the telecommunications 
sector and regulation are very important (Flacher and Jennequin (2007)). In fact, several 
economic issues are resolved, as the barriers to entry (Baranes and Flochel (1999)), 
interconnection networks (Bulatovic (2004), Colombier et al. (2010), Schiff (2005)), the level 
of pricing (Berger (2005), Dessein (2003)), privatization (Wallsten (2002)), market structure 
(De Donder (2005)) and strategic behavior competitors such as competition (Laffont and 
Tirole (2002)), collusion (Debbichi and Hichri (2013b), Parker and Roller (1997), Pénard 
(2003), Souam and Pénard (2002), Berger (2005)) , agreement merging (Artz et al. (2009)), 
entry on the market (Bourreau (2001)) or deviation. 
The mobile phone market had known recently a dynamic and changing structure in 
most of the countries who have undertaken to reform their telecommunications sectors. 
Depending on the characteristics of the local market (private or public sector) resulting from 
the restructuration and the implementation of progressive market liberalization policies, the 
number of actors (duopoly or oligopoly) and consequently their profits in the 
telecommunications industry has been variable. There are Many European operators active in 
the Arab markets. That’s why we will begin this work by exposing cases of detection of 
collusion in European countries. We’ll then study the degree of competition in the Tunisian 
market and similar Arab countries. 
Studies conducted by  The “Arab Advisor Group” show that the Cellular Competition 
Intensity Index results for April 2011 revealed that Saudi Arabia tops the score as the most 
competitive Arab market with a 76.01% mark followed by Jordan (75.37%), in the 6th rank 
Morocco (64.72%), Tunisia (63.23%) ranked 8th, and Algeria (61.17%) who was ranked 9th.  
The Cellular Competition Intensity Index is relative in nature as it compares the state of every 
market relatively to other markets. Consequently, even if a market’s absolute level of 
competition improved, its score in this relative index will also depend on at which level other 
markets are developed. 
In this work, we will first present microeconomic models dealing with market 
competition and the preference for collusion of operators on interconnected markets. Our 
goal is to study the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia and to compare the preference for 
collusion through the threshold value with three Arabian markets that are Morocco, Algeria 
and Jordan, in duopoly and oligopoly structures, where the actors are private, mixed or 
public. The market power will be estimated, based on the work of Parker and Roller (1997) 
and on the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". The comparison of the critical 
threshold of preference for collusion will be based on the model of Friedman (1971).and the 
results of Cortade (2005) and Debbichi and Hichri (2013a). Our findings can be used by the 
decision makers to control collusion, by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each 
market structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalization policies in this 
sector. 
Interconnection is a key factor for competition (Laffont et al. (1996)). Each operator 
must pay an interconnection charge to its competitor for routing the call on its network (two-
way interconnection) (Baranes and Poudou (2010), Bulatovic (2004)). The stability of the 
interconnection rate leads us to ask about the state of competition, firstly, on the 
interconnection market and, secondly, on the retail market (Parsons (2002)).  In this context, 
collusion is one of the possibilities and strategies (Colombier et al. (2010)) that actors may 
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adopt to control the market. Collusion is a strategic behavior chosen by economic agents 
when it allows better results in comparison to competition. Several studies have already 
highlighted the determinants of the choice of colluding (Parker and Roller (1997) and Hoffler 
(2009)), and especially its relationship with the level of interconnection fees. Also, 
telecommunications operators may even use a high access charge as an instrument of 
collusion (Dessein (2003)).  Laffont and Tirole (2000) present a study of competition in 
telecommunications. In the same context, a view of this competition from the United States 
was presented by Parsons (2002).  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the European cases detecting 
collusive behavior. In Section 2, we extend the work of Debbichi and Ben Khalifa (2013) to 
study the structure and state of the mobile phone market in Tunisia. The results of Debbichi 
and Hichri (2013a) related to the model of Friedman (1971) are presented in Section 3. These 
theoretical results will be applied to different countries and cases following several market 
structures and presented in section 4. Finally, we present concluding remarks. 
 
2. The European cases: 
  
 On a practical level and starting international experiences, several regulatory 
frameworks were able to detect these collusive behaviors and their natures, enhancing the 
damage incurred by the economy and to impose sanctions on operators due to these injuries. 
The cases of French and Czechs operators and even other operators of the European Union 
have the best-known cases worldwide. Detection instruments, the nature, scope and level of 
damage varies from one country to another. 
 On the mobile phone market, factors that facilitate the implementation of collusive 
behavior are: exchange of information, convergence of market shares, the monetary transfer 
between operators and communication between them through regular meetings (Pénard 
(2002)). These factors are risky for possible collusion, as it is the case of operators of mobile 
phone in France. 
 Indeed, they have implemented two types of cartel practices to restrict competition: 
exchanges of strategic information (these practices may facilitate collusion in the first row) 
and agreement between 2000 and 2002 to stabilize their market shares. This information 
exchange reduces the intensity of competition in the mobile market for a main reason: on a 
market where the entry is very difficult, the exchange of information of this type is likely to 
affect competition. Consultations in order to stabilize their market share has been established 
through the intersection of several major indexes, accurate and consistent, such as the 
existence of handwritten documents explicitly mentioning an "agreement" (explicit 
collusion), as well as similarities identified during this period in the trade policies of 
operators, particularly in terms of acquisition costs and pricing of communications. The 
Competition Council has therefore fined the three mobile operators, Orange France, SFR and 
Bouygues Telecom respectively amounting to € 256 millions, € 220 millions and € 58 
millions. 
Collusion may be related to price, quality of service and technical standardization 
networks. The establishment of such a practice is done through regular meetings of leaders. 
This is the case between “Deutsche Telekom”, “France Telecom”, “Telecom Italia”, 
“Telefonica” and “Vodafone” convicted of monopolistic agreement after secret meetings, 
four meetings in fifteen months, October 2010 in Paris, February 2011 in Barcelona, July 
2011 in Venice and on January in London. This is the subject that could be investigated by 
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the European Commission concerning a possible collusion between them, including the 
standards for future mobile communication services.  
 
3. The mobile phone market in Tunisia: Structure and Market Power: 
 
          Tunisia has one of the more developed mobile markets in Africa as indicated by the 
high level of mobile penetration. There are three mobile phone operators in the country. The 
market structure of the mobile phone in Tunisia has gone through several stages, from the 
monopolistic structure (1992-2001), to the duopolistic one (2002-2009) until reaching a three 
operators structure (from 2010 until today). In addition to the market structure, there have 
been changes in the market shares of the public and the private operators. Indeed, the 
privatization of Tunisia Telecom (T.T.) (the historical national operator) in 2006 transformed 
(theoretically) the market from a mixed (Private-Public) duopoly to a private one. With the 
entry of Orange Tunisia on the market in 2010, one should talk about a three private 
operators market. Obviously, the preference for collusion is certainly not the same in these 
different market structures. At the same time, some changing in the market structure was the 
result of a strategic behavior adopted by the several economic operators. In this context, 
collusion is one of the possibilities and strategies (Colombier et al. (2010)) that actors may 
adopt to control the market and practice market power. Latter is the ability to profitably alter 
prices away from the competitive price. It is measured often by the Lerner index. 
 
 We suppose that an operator has a real market power if it sets non-competitive prices 
above marginal cost. In absence of cost accounting, the measurement of the marginal cost 
will be more difficult and assessment of market power will become impossible. For this 
reason, Parker and Roller (1997) consider “the conduct parameter” , defined by: 
 
 + 	́ qq = θ																																																				(1) 
 − θ = −	́ qq ⇔  =  −1	́ qq  − θ								(2) 
Finally, 	 =  	́  

  ⇔ 	 =  																																									(3) 
 
where q is the quantity of interconnection exchanged between two networks, θ is the 
marginal cost, 
 
is the termination price, and  represents the demand elasticity of 
interconnection. The price elasticity of demand is assumed constant (8%) during the period 
2002-2011 for both operators, is calculated from the following formula and based on the 
hypothesis “Balanced Calling Pattern”1 (Debbichi and Ben Khalifa (2013)):    
 
                                                           
1
 Laffont and Tirole (2000) define this hypothesis as the fact that fraction of calls that is 
generated on one network and that ends on the other competing network is proportional to the 
market share of the latter. In other words, the flow of incoming and outgoing calls is balanced 
even if market shares are not. 
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\ =
" − ##"$" − "$#"$#
																																																					(4) 
The Lerner index (margin) L of one operator is equal to its market share divided by 
demand elasticity (request to interconnection) and is given by the following expression2: 
																																																 − & =
∝ =   																																																								(5) 
     The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is defined as the sum of the squared market 
shares: 
))* =+,$																																																								(6)
.
/"
 
and 
 	0 = +, 
.
/"  
⇔  	0 = +,  − θ  = 
 − θ10 																																									(7)
.
/"  
The average index is equal to  	0 = 3θ40 5 where &̅ = ∑ ,$/" θ is the weighted 
average unit cost of interconnection service. 
 
Moreover, as 

 = ∝8   this average value is also given by: 
 
																																																																										 	0 = +,$
.
/"
= ))* 																																																						(8) 
The average Lerner index is proportional to the HHI on the interconnection market.	
We are faced with two alternatives; 	 → 0  (perfect competition of interconnection market) 
and  → 1 (the market is monopolistic). Generally, in the case of Cournot competition 
between < symmetric operators,  → ".. The parameter  measures then the degree of 
collusion. In this case it’s possible to construct an econometric test to reject or to accept the 
assumption according to which the industry is (or not) competitive, and to compare the 
theoretical values to the estimated ones.	
If  	 = 0, then  = &
 
and prices are equal to marginal costs, which means that the 
industry is perfectly competitive. 
If 	 > 0, then the prices are above marginal costs and the industry is in a collusive 
situation. 
                                                           
2
 For More details see Debbichi and Ben Khalifa (2013). 
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Table 1 (Debbichi and Ben Khalifa (2013)) presents values of market power (2002-
2010) during the duopoly era. We will retain these values and complete the study of two eras: 
monopoly (1993-2001) and oligopolistic in 2011. 
Table 1 : Tunisian Market Power value (1993-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             In the table above, values marked by asterisks are not estimated by the conduct 
parameter, but using the equation   = ". with < = 1 (Number of operators) in (1993-2001) 
and < = 3 after 2010. We deduce that  → ". = "$ > 0 and that the interconnection price is 
above marginal cost. This result is valid for the three structures of the Tunisian market 
(monopoly, duopoly and triopoly). However, the intensity of market power decreases when 
the number of operators on the market increases. An econometric analysis of market power 
on the Tunisian mobile industry is presented in Debbichi (2014). 
Debbichi and Hichri (2013a) present a Cournot model that compares the intensity of 
market power using the critical threshold of collusion in duopoly and oligopoly Markets, 
where the actors are private, mixed or public. Their findings can be used by the decision 
makers to control collusion by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each market 
structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalization policies in this sector. An 
example of the market power applied to the case of The U.S Airline Industry can be found in 
Murakami and Asahi (2011). 
 
4. The Results of Debbichi and Hichri (2013a) based on the model of Friedman (1971): 
In this section, we present the theoretical results of Debbichi and Hichri (2013a), 
based on the model of Friedman (1971). The authors assume that the market is composed of 
two to three operators which are in Cournot competition. Each operator ? = 1,2,3 is 
characterized by an interconnection fee  (Flochel (1999), Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010)). 
The operators agree on a common interconnection tariff " = $ = A = . The 
authors also assume that the two operators charge retail rates that are very close ( 1 2P P P= =
                                                           
3
 Values are estimated using the equation  = ".. 
Years Market power value Years Market power value 
1993 1.00*3 2003 0.6058 
1994 1.00* 2004 0.5848 
1995 1.00* 2005 0.5103 
1996 1.00* 2006 0.5024 
1997 1.00* 2007 0.5014 
1998 1.00* 2008 0.5002 
1999 1.00* 2009 0.5018 
2000 1.00* 2010 0.4580 
2001 1.00* 2011 0.3333* 
2002 0.6058   
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). Let B = 1 − C = 1 − ("$ + $") the inverse demand function and the Q total amount of 
exchanged traffic between the two networks. 
In this model, there are two industrial configurations in the market, a private and a 
public operator. The first one maximizes his profit: 
D" = (1 − "$ − $" − ) "$+$"																																													(9) 
and the second operator maximizes the following function: 
D$ = "$ ("$ + $")$ 	+ (1 − "$ − $" − )$" + "$																											(10) 
If there is privatization of the incumbent operator, the duopoly market structure 
becomes then private. 
The model assumes that there are N operators on the Phone Market, who have the 
choice between colluding and competing. The incitation to collude will depend on the critical 
threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) that is related to the discount factor F of each 
operator. Each operator has to choose between two strategic behaviors: either competing or 
colluding, regarding to the comparison between short-term gains to deviate and long-term 
losses after deviation, in a repeated game. In such a context, collusion is possible (Debbichi 
and Hichri (2013a)) when the preference for the present, reflected by the discount rate	G, 
(with	F = ""HI and 0 ≤ F ≤ 1) is very low (Friedman (1971)). 
Players are concerned with an indefinitely repeated sequential game where in the first 
stage, at period	K = 0 , they decide to collude. If they cooperate in period	K = 1, player ?, 
where 1, 2i =  (N = 2) realizes a profit equal to DLMNN. A unilateral deviation from collusion 
will change this profit to DO8P, with DO8P > DLMNN. 
Debbichi and Hichri (2013a) suppose that a deviation of one player in period t will be 
followed by a change in the cooperative behavior of the other operator in period K + 1, such 
that the profit of each operator becomes equal to πQRST, as both operators deviate from 
collusion. Calculations of the updated value of profit after Deviation	UO8P and the updated 
value of profit after Collusion	ULMNN show that: 
	UO8P = ∑ δV∞V/" πQRWX = δ"δ πQRWX																																																				(11) 
and 
	ULMNN = + δV∞V/" πQRYY =
δ
1 − δ πQRYY																																												(12) 
 
Then, collusion is a better strategy if the profit resulting from Deviation, in a repeated 
game, is lower than the difference between the updated value of profit after Collusion and the 
updated value of profit after Deviation: 
 Z
"Z πQRYY − πQRWX > D?[\ − D?]^__																																															(13) 
From this inequality, Debbichi and Hichri (2013a) calculate the threshold of the 
discount factor F̅ from which collusion becomes possible: 
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																																																			δ > δ` = πabc − πQRY
πabc − πQRde 																																																																					(14) 
 
Consequently, if the value of δ for one operator is higher than	F0 , collusion will be the 
best strategy to choose. Table 2 presents the different theoretical values of the critical 
threshold of preference for collusion, as calculated in Debbichi and Hichri (2013a), in 
different market structures. 
 
Table 2: Value of the critical threshold of preference for collusion in different Market 
structures (Debbichi and Hichri (2013a)) 
Duopoly with private operators Oligopoly with three private operators 
 
δ	 =
164 + 14 a 3a − 125964 + 14 a 3a − 125 − 19 (1 + 2a)(1 − a)
= 917 
 
F	 =
34 $ − 23 + 3/5434 $ − 23 + 19 + 116 (1 − ). (1 − 3)
 
 
Duopoly with mixed operators Mixed oligopoly with a public operator and two 
private 
 
F̅ = a
$ + a − 34
5a$ − 3a + 14
 
 
δ` = 3a
$ + 2a − 53											9a$ − 4a + 1/3  
 
As shown in Table 1, the critical threshold of preference for collusion is constant in a 
private duopoly and is equal to j"k. This result is similar to those found by Cortade (2005) in 
the case of internet operators. 
The critical threshold of preference for collusion depends on the interconnection fees . That’s why Debbichi and Hichri (2013a) discuss then the variation of F̅, the critical 
threshold of preference for collusion (C.T.P.C.) when the interconnection fees 	vary. A 
study of the regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents can be found in 
Edwards and Waverman (2006). Another study related to Internet Interconnection is 
presented by Laffont et al. (2003). 
 
5. Application to different Arabian Market Structure: 
We propose to discuss in this section the variation of F̅, when the interconnection fees 	vary, for each Arabian market structure between 1999 and 2008. 
 
5.1. Structure of some Arabian mobile phone Markets: 
5.1.1. Algeria  
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            The Algerian mobile market structure was historically a public monopoly with one 
operator (Algeria Telecom). The first offer “GSM” (Global System for Mobile) was launched 
in 1999. Since 2001, a private operator, “Orascom Telecom Algeria,” has entered on the 
mobile phone market. The first foreign private operator has commercially launched its brand 
“Djezzy” in February 2002.Finally, last arrived on the market, “Kuwait Wataniya Telecom” 
took its license in December 2003 and, six months later, created his brand “Nedjma.” Since 
2004, three operators are competing in the market for mobile phone in Algeria (see Table 3). 
 
5.1.2. Morocco 
The Moroccan mobile market structure was historically a public monopoly with one 
operator (Maroc Telecom). With the opening of postal and telecommunications competition a 
second mobile license of type “GSM” is authorized to (Médi Telecom) in 1999. Indeed, the 
privatization of (Maroc Telecom) (the historical national operator) in 2001 transformed 
(theoretically) the market from a mixed (Private-Public) duopoly to a private one. Finally, in 
2010, a third private operator (Wana) joined the market to transform the duopoly private 
structure into a three private operators market (see Table 3). 
 
5.1.3. Jordan 
The Jordanian market structure has also experienced a profound change. Indeed, a 
second mobile license type “GSM” was launched in 1999. The privatization of the historical 
national operator in 2001 transformed (theoretically) the market from a mixed (Private-
Public) duopoly to a private one. In 2009, a third private operator joined the market to 
transform the duopoly private structure into a three private operators market (see Table 3). 
Table 3: The history of some Arabian mobile phone market structures from 1998 to 2010 
 
Years Tunisia Alegria Jordan Morocco 
1998 Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 
1999     Duo poly Duo poly 
2000     Duo poly (priv)   
2001       Duo poly(Priv) 
2002 Duo poly Duo poly     
2003         
2004   Trio poly     
2005         
2006 Duo poly(Priv)       
2007         
2008         
2009     Trio poly   
2010 Trio poly     Trio poly 
 
 5.2) Results and Discussion: 
 
          In this section, and based on calculations made by Debbichi and Hichri (2013
critical threshold of preference for collusion for several market structures, we propose to 
calculate this threshold in the case of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Jordan.
(C.T.P.C.) depends on the interconnection
along the values taken by the threshold function by changing the value of
 
As shown in Figure 1
(C.T.P.C) in Tunisia is increasing but negative during the period (2002
the year following the privatization 
remains constant. This is due to a transition from the mixed structure to the private market 
structure when the public opera
Tunisian mobile market, we had
 
and after 2006:	 
π
abc −
 
As shown in Figure 2
preference for collusion (C.T.P.C
year of entry of a third operator, t
near to zero). This is due to a transition from the 
market structure. 
In Jordanian and Moroccan market 
the critical threshold of preference for collusion (
decreasing, but remains positive
are substantially the same. 
 
Figure1:Evolution of the Critical Threshold of 
Preference for Collusion in the Tunisian Market
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duopoly market structure 
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Figure2:Evolution of the Critical Threshold of 
Preference for Collusion in the Algerian Market
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Figure3:Evolution of the Critical Threshold of 
Preference for Collusion in the Jordanian Market 
 
 
Figure4: Evolution of the Critical Threshold of 
Preference for Collusion in the Moroccan Market 
 
If we compare the Tunisian case to the Algerian one, the value of the critical threshold 
of preference for collusion is higher during the period 1999-2007, in the Algerian market than 
its value in the Tunisian one (see Figure 5). After 2007, the two values are very similar, with 
a relatively higher value on the Tunisian market. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 : Comparing the critical threshold of preference for 
collusion in the Tunisian and Algerian Market 
 
The comparison of the value of the critical threshold of preference for collusion for 
the four studied countries allows us to conclude that collusion is easier on the Tunisian 
market, than on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one. This result is logical, as the 
market for mobile phone in Algeria is more competitive (oligopolistic) during the period of 
study, in comparison to its Tunisian counterpart. The entry of a third operator on the Algerian 
market was in 2004, whereas it was the case in Tunisia only in (2010). 
Obviously, there is a relationship between the number of competitors on one market 
and collusion, as shown in Selten (1973) who presents a theory that investigates “the 
connection between the number of competitors and the tendency to cooperate.” 
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6. Concluding remarks: 
 
We characterized in this paper the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco and Jordan through the comparison of the level of the critical threshold of 
preference for collusion. This comparison is based on the market power of operators on 
interconnection markets, using the Lerner index. This index is a relevant indicator available 
for the regulator to judge the nature of competition. To keep a certain degree of competition, 
the regulator, as in Flacher and Jennequin (2007), can set the level of interconnection rate at a 
level that minimizes collusion. The regulator can control market structure to minimize prices. 
The “conduct parameter” measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 
(1993-2011), which means that interconnection prices are not oriented to marginal cost and 
that mobile phone operators practice market power. In fact, operators can maintain these high 
interconnection charges to inflate prices paid by consumers and reduce the probability of 
detecting collusion retail prices. Results show that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market 
that on the Algerian, Jordanian, and Moroccan one. A possible extension of our work could 
lead us to estimate the “conduct parameter” depending on variables related to market 
structures and prices. 
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